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The paper derives the solution to a simple stochastic continuous-time
dynamic control problem in which a consumer determines consumption and
saving while moving between employment and unemployment according to
a Markov process. The results diﬀer from the permanent income hypothesis
and some of Hall’s 1978 results based on autoregressive income shocks.
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1. Introduction
This paper describes the solution to a stochastic dynamic control problem in which
the only source of randomness is transitions between two states of a Markov
chain process. A consumer moves between employment and unemployment in
continuous time, earning diﬀerent incomes (each constant over time) in the two
states. At each point in time the consumer decides the level of consumption
and the level of accumulation or decumulation of an asset paying a constant
interest rate. The solution provides an alternative to computational methodologies
and is relevant to bankruptcy, liquidity constraints and precautionary saving.
The solution takes the form of the diﬀerential equations for consumption while
employed and unemployed. This problem will be called the Markov Consumption
Problem (hereafter MCP).
A major objective in consumption literature is to explain how saving behavior
responds to income uncertainty (see surveys by Attanasio, 1999; Deaton, 1992;
Carroll, 2001; and Hayashi, 1997). Schechtman (1976) and Schechtman and Es-
cudero (1977) establish that individuals facing income uncertainty in an inﬁnite
horizon optimal consumption problem will accumulate assets that smooth out
consumption (see also Miller, 1974). Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994, Section
2III) relate precautionary saving to uninsurable risks. Kimball (1990) establishes
conditions of the utility function that generate precautionary saving. Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) decompose saving empirically into precautionary and life cycle
components.
The MCP diﬀers from theoretical models in the above papers by having in-
come shocks that are not autoregressive. An individual who becomes unemployed
can expect to remain unemployed for some period of time before experiencing a
transition to employment. Being unemployed at one point in time reduces the
likelihood of being employed at any future point in time, although the eﬀect di-
minishes over time (Karlin and Taylor, 1975, p. 154). Then having a low income
at the current point in time (because of unemployment) increases the likelihood
of having a low income in the future. An unemployed individual will have a
lower expected growth rate of future income than if the individual were employed,
everything else the same.
Since the MCP generates a diﬀerent simultaneous optimization problem for
employment and unemployment, it generates a two-state solution to the dynamic
control problem. (The two-state nature of the solution can be seen from the two
consumption functions in Figure 3.1, one for each state.) In contrast, the analysis
of consumption and saving has been dominated by the use of discrete time single
state solutions. In these single state solutions, the consumption behavior of the
individual depends only on a single scalar state variable such as assets or perma-
nent income. Uncertainty can be introduced into the consumption saving problem
without departing from the single state apparatus. If the income shocks are inde-
3pendently and identically distributed, then the shocks only move the individual to
a diﬀerent point on the same consumption versus assets (or consumption versus
permanent income) relation. In contrast, in the MCP, the movement between em-
ployment and unemployment causes a shift from one consumption asset relation
to another.
A discussion of results for discrete time processes in Caballero (1990) and Hall
(1978) will highlight the diﬀerences between the MCP and the conventional lit-
erature. In Caballero’s paper, a consumer faces uninsured uncertain income in
discrete time and can borrow and save at a ﬁxed interest rate. Income follows an
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. Caballero shows in Proposition
1 (p. 117) that the eﬀect of an income shock or innovation aﬀects consumption
through a change in permanent income, i.e., the income shock is annuitized and
is equivalent to a change in wealth. Although the income shocks are not indepen-
dently and identically distributed, Caballero obtains a single state solution that
is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis. Income shocks simply move
the consumer to a diﬀerent point on the same relation between consumption and
permanent income (or consumption and a measure of wealth) and do not shift the
consumer to a new relation. In contrast, the Markov process in the MCP is not
autoregressive and shocks (movements between employment and unemployment)
would move the consumer to a diﬀerent consumption-wealth relation. Speciﬁcally,
the consumer’s shock can only be negative when employed and positive when un-
employed, unlike the income processes considered in Caballero’s Tables 1 and 2
(pp. 121, 122).
4In the dynamic programming solution to the problem of optimal consumption
in discrete periods, Hall (1978) concludes that the expected value of the marginal
utility of consumption in the next period will be a constant multiple of the current
marginal utility of consumption. An analogous result holds for continuous time
models. However, some of Hall’s corollaries to this result do not hold, even in
a discrete time model, when the income shocks arise from Markov movements
between employment and unemployment. In corollary 2, using Hall’s notation,




where E(εt+1)=0 . In a Markov process, the distribution of εt+1 depends on which
state the individual is in, so that the distribution of εt+1 depends on ct if assets are
known. The expected value of the error term would be positive if the individual is
unemployed and negative if employed. Hall’s corollaries 3, 4 and 5 would also fail
to hold for a Markov process if they require E(εt+1)=0 . Hall’s reasoning leads to
the conclusion that the relation
ct = λct−1 + εt (1.2)
approximates the stochastic behavior of consumption given the life cycle-permanent
income hypothesis, i.e. consumption itself follows a random walk. However, in a
Markov process, the expected value of εt at time t − 1 in this relation will vary
5depending on the state and consumption level at time t − 1. If the individual is
unemployed, it can only be positive, and if the individual is employed, it can only
be negative. The departure in this paper from Hall’s results arises as a conse-
quence of the necessary conditions for optimal consumption in the MPC taking
the form of a diﬀerential equation for each state rather than a single equation
relating consumption over time, as in Ljungqvist and Sargent’s Euler equation
1.3.3 (2004, page 4).
Deaton (1991), citing Tauchen (1986), has developed computational methods
in discrete time to examine the consequences of income shocks that would lead to
multi-state systems (see also Deaton, 1992; Aiyagari, 1994, Section IV; Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2004, chapter 4; and Judd, 1998, chapter 12). Deaton represents a
normally distributed serially correlated income generation process as movements
among income intervals with transition rates from intervals in one period to inter-
vals in the next period corresponding to the serial correlation. This discretization
of the normal distribution, with transition rates among intervals, is a version of
the MCP discussed here. Deaton concludes that serial correlation reduces the
scope for income smoothing for liquidity constrained consumers.
Conventional dynamic programming models of consumption behavior over dis-
crete periods do not permit the use of functional analysis that can be applied to
relevant features of the consumption problem. In the MCP, bankruptcy (appro-
priately deﬁned for a two state system) can serve as the initial condition for the
location of the solutions to the diﬀerential equations. However, bankruptcy occurs
at a singularity where derivatives cannot be determined by ordinary means. This
6paper develops methods for analyzing consumer behavior near bankruptcy. An-
other singularity, occurring at a break-even point, can be studied using methods
of functional analysis applied in this paper. These methods are unavailable in
the period analysis used for conventional consumption models. The application of
functional analysis in the MCP, by providing the consumption function for the two
states, generates alternative explanations for phenomena in consumption theory,
including liquidity constraints, precautionary saving, and concavity.
Following Merton’s analysis of portfolio selection (1971), optimal consumption
and saving have also been modeled in continuous time. Merton assumes a geomet-
ric Brownian mechanism for income shocks (see also Koo, 1998), which generates
a single state solution. Briys (1986) and Gollier (1994), in models of insurance
versus precautionary saving, assume Poisson wealth shocks that move the individ-
ual to a diﬀerent point on a single state relation between consumption and wealth.
Toche (2005) considers precautionary saving in continuous time when the individ-
ual may move permanently into unemployment according to a Poisson process.
Sheshinski (1989) had earlier considered a model in which income can move into
an absorbing state as a result of a stochastic process, for example because of dis-
ability, and considered consequences for changes in consumption. Kimball and
Mankiw (1989) consider an individual with stochastic income following a Markov
process in continuous time. Their formulation of the optimal consumption and
saving problem would lead to a multi-state solution but they simplify the problem
by dropping out the interaction terms among state value functions in the Bellman
equation (1989, equation 2, p. 866).
7As in Aiyagari and Hayashi, liquidity constraints and borrowing constraints
can be deﬁned and diﬀerentiated as follows. Assume that the individual cannot
default on debt (and therefore cannot engage in a Ponzi scheme) and cannot
consume negative amounts. The non-negative consumption requirement imposes
a borrowing constraint on the individual since the individual could not borrow
so much that interest on the debt exceeds income. For example, if the lowest
income is 0.5, and the interest rate on debt is .05, then the borrowing constraint
on debt would be 0.5/.05 = 10, i.e., the individual’s assets must be greater than
or equal to -10. A liquidity constraint arises when the individual cannot borrow
beyond a limit even though the individual would always be able to pay interest
on that debt. For example, if the lowest income is 0.5 and the individual cannot
borrow any assets, then the liquidity constraint would be that the individual’s
assets must be greater than or equal to zero. Since the liquidity constraint at 0
exceeds the borrowing constraint, the liquidity constraint prevents the individual
from engaging in some consumption and saving decisions that would be allowable
with just the borrowing constraint, i.e., the liquidity constraint is more restrictive.
Liquidity constraints have been proposed as an explanation for why some
households vary consumption in response to income ﬂuctuations more than would
be expected on the basis of the permanent income hypothesis (see discussions by
Deaton, 1992, Chapter 6; Carroll, 2001; Hayashi, 1997, Part I; Zeldes, 1989). A
household facing a binding liquidity constraint would be unable to smooth income
by borrowing when income is low. Consumption would then ﬂuctuate in response
to ﬂuctuations in income. In the cases considered by Deaton (with and without
8autoregressive income shocks), the individual consumes all cash on hand at suf-
ﬁciently low asset levels, so that consumption would afterwards track income. It
has also been argued that liquidity constraints generate a precautionary motive
for saving since individuals would accumulate assets to avoid episodes of binding
liquidity constraints that reduced their ability to smooth income. This paper will
consider the consequences of liquidity constraints in the context of the MCP.
The next section poses the MCP formally, derives the Hamiltonian and ad-
joint equations, and solves for the diﬀerential equations describing the optimal
consumption paths. Section 3 describes solutions to the diﬀerential equations de-
rived numerically and analyzes the break-even point that occurs in the favorable
state if the discount rate is greater than the interest rate. Section 4 concludes
with a discussion of consequences of liquidity constraints in the MCP.
2. Diﬀerential Equations
Consider an individual moving between two states of a continuous time Markov
process. Let p1 be the transition rate from state 1 to state 2, and let p2 be the
transition rate from state 2 to state 1. Suppose the individual earns income at
the rate yi when in state i. Without loss of generality, assume y1 >y 2. State 1
can be regarded as employment and state 2 as unemployment. Let A[t] be the
individual’s assets at time t. Suppose the individual earns income from assets
at the rate rA[t], where r is positive and constant over time. Let Ci[A[t]] be
the consumption rate chosen if the individual is currently in state i with assets
9A[t]. Since time only enters through discounting, the MCP is autonomous, and
consumption levels will depend only on the state and the state variable, assets.
If there is no ambiguity, the consumption levels will be written C1 and C2. Then






= rA[t]+yi − Ci[A[t]]
Suppose the consumer’s instantaneous, time-separable utility at time t has con-
stant relative risk aversion and takes the form
U[C]=( C)
γ /γ, γ < 1,γ =0
The case where U[C]=Log[C] corresponds to γ =0and can be treated using
the same methodology. Suppose future utility is discounted at the rate b. Let
Vi[A,t] be the value function for the individual in state i with assets A. If there is
no ambiguity, the value functions will be written V1 and V2. The consumer may
borrow against future income if no liquidity constraint is binding (so that A could
be negative) but may not default on borrowed funds.
Applying a dynamic programming argument (Sethi and Thompson, 2000, pp.





U[C1]e−bt + p1(V2[A[t],t] − V1[A[t],t])









U[C2]e−bt + p2(V1[A[t],t] − V2[A[t],t])





where ViA refers to the partial derivative of Vi with respect to A and Vit refers to
the partial derivative of Vi with respect to time assuming the individual remains
in state i.
Since p1(V2[A[t],t]−V1[A[t],t])+V1t does not depend on C1 or C2, the Hamil-
tonian for the individual in state 1 at time t is formed as
H1[A,C1,λ 1,t]=U[C1]e
−bt + λ1(rA[t]+y1 − C1) (2.3)
where λ1 = V1A is the adjoint variable. Analogously, the Hamiltonian for the
individual in state 2 is
H2[A,C2,λ 2,t]=U[C2]e
−bt + λ2(rA[t]+y2 − C2) (2.4)
With diﬀerentiability, the ﬁrst order conditions for the levels of consumption
1The procedure is to express V1[A[t],t] and V2[A[t],t] i nt e r m so fv a l u e sa tas m a l lp e r i o do f
time τ in the future using a Taylor series expansion and taking into account the likelihood of
transitions into the other state. Then subtracting Vi from both sides of the expression, dividing
by τ and taking the limit yields 2.1 and 2.2.












,i =1 ,2 (2.6)
Derivation of the diﬀerential equations for consumption requires the derivatives
of the adjoint variables λ1 and λ2 with respect to time. These can be constructed
using the adjoint equations generated by diﬀerentiating 2.1 and 2.2 with respect





U[C1]e−bt + p1(V2[A,t] − V1[A,t])









U[C2]e−bt + p2(V1[A,t] − V2[A,t])





2The basis for the adjoint equations can be presented brieﬂy using the development of Sethi
and Thompson (2000, pp. 31-33). Suppose C∗
1 is the optimal control that maximizes the right-
hand side of (2.1) given the optimal path of assets, A∗. T h e nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d et a k e st h ev a l u e
of zero. Consider a perturbation of A∗, say AP. In general C∗
1 will not be optimal for AP, so the
right-hand side would be less than zero. Thus A∗ maximizes the right-hand side of (2.1) given
C∗
1. This argument yields the adjoint equation for state 1 and an analogous argument holds for
state 2.
12With diﬀerentiability,
0=p1(V2A − V1A)+V1AA(rA+ y1 − C1)+rV1A + V1tA (2.9)
0=p2(V1A − V2A)+V2AA(rA+ y2 − C2)+rV2A + V2tA (2.10)
In the above, ViA = λi. Since time only enters the problem through discounting,
the system is autonomous. The eﬀect of time on the value function, Vit, is the same
as moving back the point in time to which utility is discounted. Thus Vit = −bVi
and
VitA = ∂Vit/∂A = ∂(−bVi)/∂A = −bλi,i =1 ,2 (2.11)
Then by solving the adjoint equation (2.9),
V1AA = λ1A =
(b − r)λ1 + p1(λ1 − λ2)



















be the total derivative of λ1 with respect to time when the consumer is in state
i. That is, the subscript i outside the parentheses indicates the consumer’s state
for which the derivative is calculated. These derivatives can be found from the






= −bλ1 + λ1A(rA+ y1 − C1) (2.14)













= −bλ1 + λ1A(rA+ y2 − C2)
= −bλ1 +
(b − r)λ1 + p1(λ1 − λ2)
rA+ y1 − C1
(rA + y2 − C2) (2.16)
Analogous procedures yield V2AA and (dλ2/dt)j,j=1 ,2.

















,i=1 ,2,j=1 ,2 (2.17)
Substituting (dλi/dt)j derived above and λi = C
γ−1
i e−bt from 2.5 yields diﬀerential
equations in time for consumption in each state in terms of consumption in each
state and assets.
Since the MCP is an autonomous system, consumption in each state depends
only on assets and not on time. Diﬀerential equations in terms of consumption










That is, the diﬀerential equations for consumption with respect to assets are
14the same whether calculated from time derivatives in state 1 or state 2. These
calculations yield the following result.



























rA+ y2 − C2
(2.20)
3. Description of Solutions
Description of the solutions to the diﬀerential equations in Theorem 2.1 will be
facilitated by reference to examples generated by numerical solution. For compar-
ison with results from the literature on precautionary saving, assume that b>r
and that there is a liquidity constraint at A =0(i.e., assets must be greater than
or equal to zero). It is unnecessary to impose a transversality condition (equivalent
to a bankruptcy constraint) on the solution since a binding liquidity constraint is
more restrictive. Diﬀerential equations such as the pair in the theorem above de-
scribe a family of curves rather than a single speciﬁc solution. A speciﬁc solution
can be found by requiring that the consumption curves satisfy particular initial
conditions given by C1 and C2 at some asset level. Given the initial conditions, it
is then usually possible to solve the diﬀerential equations for consumption levels
at other asset levels. Since C2 would equal y2 at the liquidity constrained asset
15level A =0 , it would appear to be convenient to specify the initial conditions at
that asset level. However, the diﬀerential equation for dC2/dA in 2.20 cannot be
used to ﬁnd consumption at diﬀerent asset levels because the denominator in 2.20
is then zero and the derivative is inﬁnite at A =0 .
Instead, the following procedure can be applied. The initial conditions for the
diﬀerential equations determine the asset level at which consumption just equals
income in the employed state. Let As be the break-even asset level at which this
occurs, so that C1 = rAs + y1. Instead of ﬁnding the break-even asset level for
a given set of initial conditions, it is possible to specify the initial conditions in
terms of the break-even asset level As. Since the slope of the derivative dC1/dA
will be positive and ﬁnite at As, the numerator in 2.19 will be zero at the same
time the denominator is zero, i.e. the diﬀerential equation will have a singularity
at As.(Singularities are treated in Courant,1936, p. 551, and Knopp, 1945, Section
IV.) Setting the numerator of 2.19 equal to zero and solving yields the following
result.





p1 + b − r
 1/(1−γ)
(3.1)
Applying L’Hospital’s rule by diﬀerentiating the numerator and denominator
of 2.19 with respect to A yields an expression that can be solved for dC1/dA. Then
using 3.1 and the derivatives for consumption with respect to assets yields values
of C1 and C2 just below and just above As. These initial conditions can be used













Figure 3.1: Consumption with Liquidity Constraint
to solve the diﬀerential equations for C1 and C2 below and above the singularity
point. By varying As, it is possible to determine a solution such that the limit of
C2 as At approaches zero is y2, satisfying the liquidity constraint. The solution
is shown in Figure 3.1, with the singularity for the diﬀerential equation for C1
occurring at As = .439. The solution assumes p1 = .2447,p 2 =3 .828,y 1 =1 ,
y2 = .5,γ= .5,r= .027 and b = .03.
In state 2 (unemployment), the individual always dissaves because consump-
17tion exceeds income. As assets decline during unemployment, consumption re-
mains substantially above income but then declines sharply as assets approach
the liquidity constrained level. Since the slope of the consumption curve is inﬁnite
at the liquidity constraint, the individual’s assets would decline to the liquidity
constrained level A =0in a ﬁnite amount of time. This corresponds to Deaton’s
discrete time result (1991) where the individual consumes all cash on hand in the
current period for low asset levels.
In state 1, employment, the individual dissaves at asset levels above As but
saves when A<A s. At asset levels below As, the asset level alternatively increases
and decreases as the individual moves between employment and unemployment.
The break-even asset level As determines where the individual switches from sav-
ing to dissaving and corresponds to Carroll’s buﬀer stock target level of wealth
(1997).
Figure 3.2 compares consumption in state 2 with and without a liquidity con-
straint. In the absence of a liquidity constraint, individual borrowing is limited
by the requirement that consumption should always be nonnegative and that the
individual cannot default on debt. Then the budget constrained lower limit on
debt is −y2/r, at which consumption during unemployment would reach zero. The
individual never reaches asset level −y2/r since dissaving slows as the individual
approaches bankruptcy. Deﬁne Amin = −y2/r as the budget constrained asset
level. Without a liquidity constraint, consumption in state 2 (unemployment) is
greater at each asset level, although the two consumption levels approach each
other as assets increase. Similarly, consumption in state 1 is higher without a
18liquidity constraint. The break-even point in state 1 occurs at a much lower asset
level, As = −17.7 for the case shown in Figure 3.2. Despite appearances, the
derivative of consumption with respect to assets in state 2 is not inﬁnite at Amin,
as indicated in the following result.
Proposition 3.2. In the absence of a liquidity constraint, at the budget con-




b + p2 − rγ
1 − γ
(3.2)
Proof. Since C2 approaches zero at Amin = −y2/r, both the numerator and de-
nominator of dC2/dA are zero and the diﬀerential equation has a singularity at
that asset level. Applying L’Hospital’s rule and solving yields 3.2.
The reason for the diﬀerent behavior of C2 at Amin = −y2/r compared to the
solution with a liquidity constraint is that the Inada condition holds at Amin, i.e.,
the marginal utility of consumption Cγ−1 becomes inﬁnite at that asset level but
not at A =0 . As a consequence of the ﬁnite slope of C2 at Amin, assets would
never decline to that level and consumption would remain positive for any positive
amount of time in state 2.
It is possible to solve for the levels of the value functions with and without
liquidity constraints. The eﬀect of liquidity constraints is to reduce the levels of
the value functions, as one would expect from any restriction placed on optimal
behavior. In the absence of a liquidity constraint, the optimal behavior for the














Figure 3.2: Consumption in Unemployment with and without Liquidity Con-
straint
20unemployed individual is to go into deeper and deeper debt and rely on an eventual
transition to employment to reduce the debt level.
Three diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume out of income can be identi-













In 3.3 and 3.4, the change in income occurs because of a change in assets, and
the marginal propensity to consume is derived from the derivative of consumption
with respect to assets in 2.19 and 2.20 for states 1 and 2, respectively. Note that
2.19 and 2.20 provide the marginal propensities to consume at the same asset level
but not at the same income level. A comparison at the same income level can
be obtained by using MPC1[At] and MPC2[At +( y1 − y2)/r]. In 3.5, the change
in income arises from a transition from one state to another, and the marginal
propensity to consume is calculated as the change in consumption divided by the
change in income.
Since the curve for C2[At] is not simply the curve C1[At] shifted to the left
by (y1 − y2)/r, the two marginal propensities to consume in 3.3 and 3.4 calcu-
lated for the same income level will in general be unequal. The asset changes
that generate 3.3 and 3.4 aﬀect income indeﬁnitely into the future and correspond
21roughly to long run marginal propensities to consume. They start out high, much
greater than one, at asset levels close to minimum levels (0 or −y2/r, depending
on whether there is a liquidity constraint), and decline towards the risk-free level
at very high asset levels, b/r. In the case shown in the ﬁgures, b/r > 1, so the
ﬁrst two marginal propensities to consume are always greater than one. The third
marginal propensity to consume is generated by a change in income from a tran-
sition between employment and unemployment, and corresponds roughly to the
marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income in the permanent in-
come hypothesis since the transition alters expected future income much less than
current income. The third marginal propensity to consume is very low relative to
the ﬁrst two marginal propensities to consume, and is much less than one. Ad-
ditional marginal propensities to consume could be generated from unanticipated
parameter changes, e.g. y1, y2, or r.
These consumption responses correspond roughly but not exactly to the re-
sponses in Deaton’s analysis (1991). In Deaton’s analysis, in the range of assets
where all cash on hand is spent, the marginal propensity to consume out of in-
come in response to a change in assets is 1/r, a very large response. This case
corresponds to MPC2[At] in 3.4 with assets near the minimum level determined
by either the liquidity constraint or the budget constraint. In the liquidity con-
strained case, as shown in Figure 3.1, MPC2[At] increases indeﬁnitely as assets
decline to zero while in the unemployed state. If instead the change is in non-asset
income, then in Deaton’s analysis the marginal propensity to consume equals 1
when the individual has assets in the interval where all cash on hand is spent.
22This corresponds to MPC3[At] in the MPC, arising from a transition between
employment and unemployment. From Figure 3.1, MPC3[At] approaches about
.8 as assets decline to the liquidity constrained level.
In the permanent income hypothesis, consumption depends on a measure of
permanent income that incorporates the expected present value of future income
streams. In the MCP, it is possible to calculate the expected present value of labor
incomes from the Markov movements between employment and unemployment.
The diﬀerence in the expected present values of future labor incomes between
employment and unemployment is
b(y1 − y2)
b + p1 + p2
(3.6)
If the permanent income hypothesis were strictly valid for the MCP, the diﬀer-
ence in consumption between the two states would be a constant proportion of
the diﬀerence in present values in 3.6. Then the consumption functions for the
two states in Figure 3.1 would diﬀer by a constant vertical amount. However, the
ﬁgure shows that the diﬀerence in consumption is large near bankruptcy and then
declines to a much smaller diﬀerence as ﬁnancial assets increase. The MCP is
therefore inconsistent with a formulaic version of the permanent income hypoth-
esis.
The solution with b<rcan be brieﬂy described. There will be a break-even
asset level As in state 2 instead of state 1. At asset levels above As, the individual
saves in both states instead of dissaving. Below As, the consumer dissaves in state
232, unemployment, and saves in state 1, as in the case where b>r .
4. Conclusions
From the foregoing results, it is possible to examine the consequences of liquidity
constraints. First, consider whether liquidity constraints generate a qualitatively
diﬀerent solution to the optimal consumption problem. In Deaton’s analysis, liq-
uidity constraints lead the individual to consume all cash on hand for suﬃciently
low asset levels. In the MCP, a corresponding phenomenon occurs in which un-
employed individuals reach zero assets and consume exactly their income y2 a
positive proportion of the time. This suggests that liquidity constraints in both
the MCP and computational approaches track income part of the time. However,
Hayashi notes that there will be a budget constraint in the individual’s consump-
tion problem that is equivalent to a liquidity constraint. The eﬀect of a liquidity
constraint would then be to shift the constraint on the individual’s consumption
rather than to generate a constraint where none existed. This appears to be the
case in the MCP because, in Figure 3.1, the liquidity constraint shifts the asset
level at which consumption equals income while unemployed from −y2/r to 0.
Nevertheless, the solution without a liquidity constraint diﬀers qualitatively
from the solution with a liquidity constraint. Without a liquidity constraint, at
A = −y2/r (where the individual’s income while unemployed just equals interest
on the individual’s debt and consumption would be zero), the slope of the con-
sumption function C2[A] is positive and ﬁnite from Proposition 2. This contrasts
24with the inﬁnite slope at A =0in the liquidity constraint case. Then the indi-
vidual never reaches Amin = −y2/r in a ﬁnite amount of time. The proportion
of time that an unemployed worker spends entirely their income would be zero.
Also, since individuals never reach the break-even point while employed in a ﬁ-
nite amount of time, virtually no individual consumes entirely their income in the
absence of a liquidity constraint.
A point that arises from being able to view the consumption functions in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is that signiﬁcant features of consumption occur at low as-
set levels near either bankruptcy or the liquidity constraint. The conventional
economic literature on consumption has mostly used discrete period analysis (in
order to provide empirically relevant conclusions). This paper, by using continu-
ous time, has been able to apply methods of analysis to the singularities occurring
at bankruptcy or break-even points, thereby providing limiting results at those
points.
The methodology developed in this paper provides deterministic consumption
functions for each state because the stochastic process generating uncertainty
consists entirely of movements between the two states. The consumption functions
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show directly changes in consumption behavior between
employment and unemployment, with and without liquidity constraints, and in the
limit as assets approach minimum levels. This paper has described consequences of
liquidity constraints. Other consumption phenomena that can be studied include
bankruptcy in the absence of a liquidity constraint and the determination of the
break-even level of assets (where consumption equals income in one of the states).
25The methodology can be extended to describe uncertainty generated by other
Markov process transitions, such as movements in the interest rate between two
levels.
References
[1] Aiyagari, S. Rao (1994), “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Sav-
ing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 109 (3), 659-684.
[2] Attanasio, Orazio P. (1999), “Consumption,” in John B. Taylor and Michael
Woodford, eds, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1B, Amsterdam, El-
sevier, 741-812.
[3] Briys, E. (1986), “Insurance and Consumption: The Continuous-Time Case,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance Vol. 53, 718-723.
[4] Caballero, Ricardo J. (1990), “Consumption Puzzles and Precautionary Sav-
ings,” Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 25, 113-136.
[5] Carroll, Christopher D. (1997), “Buﬀer-Stock Saving and the Life Cy-
cle/Permanent Income Hypothesis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol.
112(1), 1-55.
[6] Carroll, Christopher D. (2001), “A Theory of the Consumption Function,
With and Without Liquidity Constraints,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
Vol. 15(3), 23-45.
26[7] Courant, R. (1936), Diﬀerential and Integral Calculus, Volume II, New York:
Interscience.
[8] Deaton, Angus (1991), “Saving and Liquidity Constraints,” Econometrica
Vol. 59(5), 1221-1248.
[9] Deaton, Angus (1992), Understanding Consumption, Oxford, Clarendon
Press.
[10] Gollier, Christian (1994), “Insurance and Precautionary Capital Accumula-
tion in a Continuous-Time Model,” Journal of Risk and Insurance Vol. 61(1),
78-95.
[11] Gourinchas, Pierre-Oliver and Parker, Jonathan A. (2002), “Consumption
Over the Life Cycle,” Econometrica Vol. 70(1), 47-89.
[12] Judd, Kenneth L. (1998), Numerical Methods in Economics,C a m b r i d g e ,M A :
MIT Press.
[13] Hall, Robert E. (1978), “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent
Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 86(6), 971-987.
[14] Hayashi, Fumio (1997), Understanding Saving; Evidence from the United
States and Japan, Cambridge, MIT Press.
27[15] Huggett, Mark (1993), “The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent
Incomplete-Insurance Economies,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol Vol. 17, 953-969.
[16] Karlin, Samuel and Taylor, Howard (1975), A First Course in Stochastic
Processes, 2nd edition, New York, Academic Press.
[17] Kimball, Miles S. (1990), “Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the
Large,” Econometrica Vol. 58, 53-73.
[18] Kimball, Miles S. and Mankiw, N. Gregory (1989), “Precautionary Saving
and the Timing of Taxes,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 97(4), 863-879.
[19] Knopp, Konrad (1945), Theory of Functions, Part I, New York: Dover.
[20] Koo, Hyent Keun (1998), “Consumption and Portfolio Selection with Labor
Income: A Continuous Approach,” Mathematical Finance Vol. 8(1), 49-65.
[21] Ljungqvist, Lars and Sargent, Thomas J. (2004), “Recursive Macroeconomic
Theory,” Cambridge: MIT Press.
[22] Merton, Robert C. (1971), “Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a
Continuous-Time Model,” Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 3, 373-413.
[23] Miller, Bruce L. (1974), “Optimal Consumption with a Stochastic Income
Stream,” Econometrica Vol. 42(2), 253-266.
[24] Schechtman, Jack (1976), “An Income Fluctuation Problem,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory Vol. 12, 218-241.
28[25] Schechtman, Jack and Escudero, Vera L.S. (1977), “Some Results on ‘An
Income Fluctuation Problem’,” Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 16, 151-
166.
[26] Sethi, Suresh P. and Thompson, Gerald L. (2000), Optimal Control The-
ory; Applications to Management Science and Economics, Second Edition,
Boston: Kluwer.
[27] Sheshinski, Eytan (1989), “A Simple Model of Optimum Life-Cycle Con-
sumption with Earnings Uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 49,
169-178.
[28] Tauchen, George (1986), “Finite State Markov Chain Approximations to Uni-
variate and Vector Autoregressions,” Economics Letters Vol. 20, 177-181.
[29] Toche, Patrick (2005), “A Tractable Model of Precautionary Saving in Con-
tinuous Time,” Economics Letters Vol. 87, 267-272.
[30] Zeldes, Stephen P. (1989), “Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income:
Deviations from Certainty Equivalence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol. 104(2), 275-298.
29